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Available online 20 June 2015AbstractThe dual-channel supply chain model has become increasingly popular in the industry and describes a scenario in which a firm,
in addition to selling through the traditional supply chain of manufacturer and retailer, opens a direct channel to the customer
through Internet sales. However, in the current global business environment, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a determining
factor of choices of the customers. Based on the above important factors, this article introduces a corporate social responsibility
two-echelon dual-channel supply chain. In addition to operating an online channel, the manufacturer intends to increase stake-
holders' welfare by exhibiting CSR. The pricing decisions for both the cases of the decentralized and centralized scenarios are
studied analytically as well as numerically. The paper also examines the effect of the degree of concern of the manufacturer
regarding CSR on product compatibility and discusses feasibility of the successful operation of a dual-channel supply chain.
Finally, channel coordination through all unit quantity discounts with the agreement of a franchise fee and surplus profit division
through bargaining is discussed analytically.
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facturer captures the markets situated in geographically
diverse locations through an online channel via the
Internet that reduces the time consumption for pur-
chasing, and hence it can also increase market share. In
Western Europe, e-commerce spending hit 128 billion
Euros in 2013, up 14.3% from that in 2012. In 2010,
the Czech Republic earned 24% of the country's total
turnover through online channels. Global e-commerce
sales topped 1 trillion for the first time in 2012 [23]. It
is forecasted that e-commerce spending in 2017 willniversity, Dalian University of Technology, Kokushikan University.
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annual growth rate of approximately 11% [24]. E-
commerce sales in the US were increased by 15.8% in
2013 compared to the year 2011. It is observed that
consumers prefer alternatives and choose the one that
is better suited to their needs, which compels manu-
facturers to restructure their traditional brick-and-
mortar channels by engaging in direct sales through
Internet channels [48].
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can be
defined as a doctrine that promotes the expansion of
social stewardship by businesses and organizations.
The CSR approach is holistic and integrated with the
core of the business strategy by addressing social and
environmental impacts of the businesses. CSR suggests
that corporations embrace responsibilities toward a
broader group of stakeholders, such as customers,
employees, etc., besides their regular financial obliga-
tions to stockholders [20]. In the current global busi-
ness environment, CSR is now a determining factor in
consumers' and clients' choices that cannot be ignored
by companies. The companies that fail to maximize
their adoption of a CSR strategy will be left behind.
Recently, empirical evidence has shown that customers
are willing to pay a higher price for products with CSR
attributes and that CSR programmes influence 70 per
cent of all consumers' buying decisions [4,10]. As a
result, many leading international brands, such as
Walmart, Nike, Adidas and Gap, have been compelled
to incorporate CSR in their complex supply chains via
a code of conduct [3].
Several research works have been conducted in the
area of supply chain coordination. Many of them
concentrate on the direct collaboration between two
individual members, whereas the models dealing with
resolving channel conflict in dual-channel supply
chains are notably fewer. The purpose of this present
article is to incorporate CSR in a dual-channel supply
chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer. In
addition to traditional retail channels, the manufacturer
operates an online channel. The manufacturer, as the
leader of the channel, considers stakeholders' welfare
through CSR and influences the downstream channel
members to behave socially. Instead of the manufac-
turer's CSR activity, we also incorporate the effect of
CSR in the form of consumer surplus in its profit
function. In a manufacturer-Stackelberg game, setting
apart the discussion of the effects of CSR in decen-
tralized and centralized decision-making, we apply all
unit quantity discounts with the agreement of a fran-
chise fee to resolve channel conflict and to find out
winewin profits of the channel members.Literature review
In the recent trends of global business scenarios, the
dual-channel supply chain has a significant importance
in supply chain management. In addition to a retail
channel, an Internet channel of the manufacturer has
the potential to reduce retailers' dominance, addressing
different customer segments in order to gain a higher
profit margin. For instance, with the popularity of the
Internet, many top manufacturers, such as IBM, Cisco,
Nike and Estee Lauder, have started selling online
directly. Several electronics manufacturers, including
Sony, PalmOne and Samsung, have set up boutique-
style outlets in upscale locations. The largest
English-language publisher, Random House, has pub-
licly declared that it may sell books directly to the
readers, putting them in direct competition with Barnes
and Noble and Amazon.com [49].
Meanwhile, traditional companies are expanding
their business through online access at retail stores. Dell
has installed kiosks in shopping malls and now sells its
computers through Costco [30]. These studies suggest
that more consumers are embracing multiple channels
to satisfy their shopping needs [47]. Some customers
prefer purchasing online, whereas others prefer shop-
ping in retail stores. As a result, manufacturers redesign
their traditional channel structures by engaging in direct
sales to reach different customer segments that cannot
be reached by the traditional retail channel, giving birth
to dual channels. Several issues in dual-channel supply
chains have been addressed by researchers. Hua et al.
[21] analysed the effect of delivery lead-time on the
pricing decisions in a dual-channel supply chain. Dan
et al. [14] determined the optimal retail service and
prices in a dual-channel supply chain. Chen et al. [8]
developed a dual-channel supply chain and proposed
pricing strategies that maximize decentralized dual-
channel performance. Sharma and Mehrotra [46]
claimed that the dual-channel setup increases channel
conflict, though it has the potential to increase cus-
tomers' demand. Yan [50] developed a dual-channel
supply chain and analysed the effect of differentiated
branding. Chiang et al. [9] proposed a model that
demonstrates that a dual-channel supply chain can be
used to control retailers' prices. Panda et al. [39,42]
analysed pricing and replenishment decisions in a
dual-channel supply chain considering continuous unit
cost decrease. All of the proposed models mentioned
above have addressed pricing and replenishment pol-
icies, channel conflict and channel competition, mainly
between brick-and-mortar and Internet channels, but
they do not focus on corporate social responsibility.
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regulation, which currently does not have a unique
definition. Dahlsrud [15] analysed 37 definitions of
CSR and developed five dimensions of CSR: envi-
ronmental, social, economic, stakeholder, and volun-
tariness. Dyllick and Hockert [17] defined CSR as
“meeting the needs of a firm's direct and indirect
stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, employees, clients,
pressure groups, communities etc.), without compro-
mising its ability to meet the needs of future stake-
holders as well.” Applications of CSR in supply chains
have emerged in the last two decades. Considering a
socially responsible supply chain, Murphy and Poist
[32] suggested a total responsibility approach by
adding social issues to the traditional economy. Carter
and Jennings [7] explained the necessity of CSR
consideration in supply chain decision-making through
a case study and survey research. Analysing a French
sample data set, Ageron et al. [1] derived several
conditions for successful sustainable supply chain
management. Cruz [11] traced the equilibrium condi-
tion for an environmentally responsible supply chain
network by using a multi-criteria decision-making
approach. Cruz and Wakolbinger [13] extended the
model to a multi-period setting for measuring long-
term effects of CSR. Considering a socially respon-
sible supply chain network, Hsueh and Chang [25]
showed that social responsibility sharing through
monetary transfer leads to channel optimization. Cruz
[12] developed a decision support system framework
for modelling and analysis of a CSR supply chain
network. Ni et al. [35] developed a two-tier CSR
supply chain by assuming the dominant upstream
channel member's CSR cost, which is shared by the
downstream channel member through a wholesale
price contract. Ni and Kevin [34] investigated a two-
echelon supply chain by assuming individual CSR
costs for each channel member. They examined the
effects of strategic interactions between the channel
members via a game theoretical approach. Panda [36]
and Panda et al. [38] considered CSR supply chains
and used different contracts to resolve channel conflict.
They used a Nash bargaining product to divide surplus
profit between the channel members.
Coordination among channel members is impera-
tive for improving channel-wide performance because
it neutralizes the difference between the decentralized
and centralized outcomes. The main objective of a
coordination mechanism is the transfer of money from
one channel member to another while they act
coherently. Existing literature has rich content in this
regard for two-echelon supply chains. Quantitydiscounts [38], two-part tariffs [26], revenue sharing
[36], mail-in-rebates [45], buyback [16], disposal cost
sharing [37,43], profit sharing [31], etc. are used to
resolve double marginalization in a two-tier supply
chain. However, there are a few papers that have
focused on cutting out channel conflict in dual-
channel supply chains. Chen et al. [8] used whole-
sale prices and manufacturers' direct channel price
contracts for channel coordination. They also sug-
gested that two-part tariffs and profit sharing in a
range coordinates the channel and that the channel
members' profits follow a winewin strategy. Agrawal
et al. [2] showed that sales effort resolves channel
conflict when the channels do compete with each
other. Cai [6] proposed a hybrid revenue sharing and
linear online retail prices relationship to cut out
channel conflict and examined the influence of chan-
nel coordination on the supplier. Panda [40,41] used
revenue sharing contracts and Nash bargaining for
channel coordination and under quantity-price and
time-price dependent demand. Boyacci [5] showed
that revenue sharing, buyback and wholesale price
contracts are unable to resolve double marginaliza-
tion. He mentioned that a penalty contract can coor-
dinate a dual-channel supply chain, though it is
difficult to implement. However, CSR in the model-
ling of channel coordination has not been considered
in the models reported above.
The research reported in this paper differs from the
prior works in many aspects, as follows. First, unlike
the natural intention of maximizing the channel
members' profits, the objectives of the channel mem-
bers are to engage in CSR and to find the effects of
CSR on the dual-channel supply chain. The outcomes
of the paper indicate that the profits of the members of
the chain are always higher than their individual pure
profits when the channel members concentrate more on
CSR. Second, the paper discusses the effect of CSR on
the pricing issues of a product. Third, the paper ana-
lyses the effect of customers' channel preference on the
channel competition for optimal prices. Fourth, it ex-
amines the effect of CSR on product compatibility and
discusses feasibility for successful operation of a dual-
channel supply chain. Fifthly, the paper uses all unit
quantity discounts with agreement of franchise fees as
the contract mechanism to resolve channel conflict. It
cuts out channel conflict but is unable to depict
winewin profits for the channel members. Sixthly, the
paper uses a Nash bargaining product to divide the
surplus profit between the channel members, where
integrated profits of all of the members of the chain are
winewin.
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We consider a dual-channel supply chain
comprising a manufacturer and a retailer. The manu-
facturer produces and sells products through retail as
well as e-tail/online channels. Here, the price-demand
relationship is deterministic and known. Following
Yue and Liu [51], Kurata et al. [28] and Huang and
Swaminathan [22], we assume that, for model
simplicity, the channel demand functions in the two
channels are linear in self-price and cross-price effects.
The forms of the demand functions in retail and e-tail
(online) channels are
Dr ¼ qa b1pr þ aðpd  prÞ ð1Þ
and
Dd ¼ ð1 qÞa b2pd þ aðpr  pdÞ ð2Þ
where a> 0 is the market potential. The parameter q
(0  q  1) is the compatibility of the product with the
retail channel. How the product is perceived within the
context of the customers' lifestyles choices is dependent
on the compatibility of the product. When the product
closely matches the needs, wants, beliefs, values and
consumptions patterns of the customers, it can be
considered highly compatible with the consumers'
choices. The percentage of the primary demand that
goes to the retail channel is q, and, when the value of q
is greater, the product's compatibility with the retail
channel is larger and more consumers purchase the
product from the retail channel. Computer-related
products, books, information, magazines and digital
products have more compatibility with the direct
channel than products such as water, rice, gasoline and
milk. Here, b1(>0) and b2(>0) are the price sensitivity
factors in the retail channel and online channel,
respectively. The parameter a(>0) is the cross-price
effect, which reflects the degree of price competition
between the channels. Quite often, the selling price in
the online channel is higher than the manufacturer's
wholesale price, i.e., pd > wm. Otherwise, the retailer
would purchase the product through the online channel
rather than from the manufacturer. Additionally, for the
profitability of the retailer, the selling price of the
retailer is higher than the manufacturer's wholesale
price, i.e., pr > wm.
Many leading brands face intense pressure for so-
cially responsible supply chain management [3]. A
commonly noted response to this pressure is to main-
tain the code of conduct given to the business partners
who are socially responsible [44]. For quantitativeanalysis, the paper considers only the effect of CSR in
the form of consumer surplus rather than the CSR
activities, which are performed by the socially
responsible channel members. It is well established
that a firm's social responsibility is accounted for
through the consumer surplus that is accrued from its
stakeholders [18,19,27,29,34,35]. The consumer sur-
plus is the difference between the maximum price that
the consumers are willing to pay for a product and the
market price that they actually pay for the product.
Thus, in the present model, the consumer surplus can
be found as
CS¼
Zpr=max
pr=mkt
Drdpr þ
Zpd=max
pd=mkt
Dddpd
¼ D
2
r
2ðb1þ aÞ þ
D2d
2ðb2þ aÞ ð3Þ
where pr=mkt ¼ ðqaþ apd  DrÞ=ðb1 þ aÞ and pd=mkt ¼
ðð1 qÞaþ apr  DdÞ=ðb2 þ aÞ denote the market
prices of the product in retail and online channels,
respectively, and pr=max ¼ ðqaþ apdÞ=ðb1 þ aÞ and
pd=max ¼ ðð1 qÞaþ aprÞ=ðb2 þ aÞ denote the
maximum prices that consumers are willing to pay for a
product in retail and online channels, respectively.
If t (0t  1) is the degree of CSR that is the
socially responsible manufacturer's concern, then it
incorporates tCS as the consumer surplus in its profit.
The value of t ¼ 0 implies that the manufacturer is the
pure profit maximizer, and t ¼ 1 represents that the
manufacturer is the perfect welfare maximizer.
Because the manufacturer is socially responsible, its
profit function consists of pure profit that is received by
selling the product and consumer surplus through CSR
practices. Under this setting, we first derive the
centralized and decentralized decisions of the channel
members.
Decentralized decisions
In decentralized decision-making, the channel
members operate independently and optimize their
individual goals. Interactions between the manufac-
turer and the retailer are considered as a Stackelberg
game. The manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader
of the channel, and the retailer is its follower. In a
Stackelberg game, the leader makes the first move, and
the follower then reacts by playing the best move
consistent with the available information. In this way,
the manufacturer first announces the wholesale price
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Based on the manufacturer's decision, the retailer de-
termines the retail price. The profit function of the
retailer is
pr ¼ ðpr wmÞðq a b1 pr þ aðpd  prÞÞ ð4Þw*m ¼
2
44b1b2ðb2caþ b1cb2 þ aðaþ b2qÞÞ þ aðb2aþ b1b2Þðaþ b2qÞt22b21cb22þ aððaþ b2cÞaÞð3b2 þ 2aÞ þ ab2ð4b2 þ 3aÞ qÞþ
b1 b2ðcað5b2 þ 2 aÞ þ að4b2qþ að3þ qÞÞÞ

t
3
5
ðb2aþ b1b2Þð2 tÞðb2ð4aþ b1ð4 tÞÞ  b2atÞ
ð8Þ
p*d ¼
2
44b1b2ðb2caþ b1cb2þ aðb1 b1qÞÞ þ aðb2aþ b1b2Þðb1  b1qÞt2b1 ðc ðb2þ 2a Þðb2a þ b1b2Þ þ a ð5 b1b2þ a ð5b2þ 2a ÞÞÞ
ab2 a 2þ 5 b21 b2þ 3 b1að2b2þ aÞ q

t
3
5
ðb2aþ b1b2Þð2 tÞðb2ð4aþ b1ð4 tÞÞ  b2atÞ
ð9ÞThe pure profit function of the manufacturer is
pm ¼ ðwm cÞðq a b1 pr þ aðpd prÞÞ þ ðpd cÞ
 ðð1 qÞa b2 pd aðpd prÞÞ
ð5Þ
The total profit function of the manufacturer is
vm ¼ pmþ t CS ð6Þ
where 0  t  1.v2vm
vp2d
¼
4 b1 b2 ð2b1b2þ a ð2b2þ a ÞÞ
þ4 b21 b22þ b1 ab2ð8 b2þ 5 aÞ þ a24b22þ 5 b2aþ 2a2 t

4b21b2
ð11ÞDifferentiating pr with respect to pr and equating it
to zero, we have
pr ¼ q aþ ðb1 þ aÞwmþ apd
2ðb1þ aÞ ð7ÞNote that d
2pr
dp2r
¼ 2ðb1 þ aÞ< 0. That is, pr is a
concave function of pr. Substituting the value of pr into
the total profit function of the manufacturer and the
necessary conditions

vvm
vwm
¼ 0 & vvmvpd ¼ 0

for opti-
mization of vm yieldswhere b1 ¼ ðb1 þ aÞ and b2 ¼ ðb2 þ aÞ. The optimal
solutions will maximize the manufacturer's total profit
function if the profit function is concave with respect to
its decision variables. To check the concavity of the
total profit function of the manufacturer, we take the
second-order partial derivatives of the profit function,
which are as follows
v2vm
vw2m
¼4ab2þ b1b2ð  4þ t Þ þ aðb2þ 2aÞt
4b2
ð10Þv2vm
vwmpd
¼ a ½a ð3b1b2 þ a ð3b2þ 2a ÞÞt
4b1b2
ð12Þ
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2vm
vw2m
< 0 and v
2vm
vp2
d
< 0 for any t2½0; 1. Now,
the necessary condition for concavity of vm is
v2vm
vw2m
v2vm
vp2d


v2vm
vwmpd
2
¼ ðb2a þ b1b2Þ ð2 t Þ ð4ab2þ b1b2ð4 t Þ b2at Þ
4b1b2p*r ¼
b2

b21cb2 þ b1cað3b2þ 2aÞ þ að2ðaþ b2cÞaþ 3ab2q Þ
aðb2aþ b1b2Þðaþ b2qÞt
ðb2aþ b1b2Þ ðb2ð4aþ b1ð4 t ÞÞ 
D*d ¼
b2ðc ð  2b1ð2b2þ aÞ  b2a ð4 t Þ þ b1b2t Þ þ a ðb1
ð2 tÞðb2ð4aþ b1ð4 tÞÞ 
p*r ¼
1
b1

b1ð2ab2q b1cb2ð2 tÞ þ b2cat aðaþ b2qÞtÞ
ð2 tÞðb2ð4aþ b1ð4 t ÞÞ  b2atÞ
2
p*m ¼
b1ð  2ab2qþ b1cb2ð2 tÞ  b2catþ
ðb2 ðcð2b1ð2b2 þ aÞ þ b2a ð4 t Þ  b1b2t Þ  aðb1ð1ðb2 aþ b1b2Þð2 tÞ2ðb2ð4aþ b1ð4
v*m ¼
2
664
2a2b2

2b21 4b1b1qþ ðb1ð2b1þ b2Þ þ ðb1þ b
a2

b1ðb1b2þ aðb2þ 2aÞÞ þ 2b1ðb2a b1b2Þqþ

b21b
2acðb2aþ b1b2Þð2b2ð  2b1 þ b1qÞ þ ðb1ðb2þ 2aÞ 
c2ðb2aþ b1b2Þð2b2

b21þ 2b2aþ 2b1b2
 ðb1þ b2Þð
ð2ðb2 aþ b1b2Þð2 tÞðb2ð4aþ b1ð4 tÞÞ For any t2½0; 1, v2vm
vw2m
v2vm
vp2
d


v2vm
vwmpd
2
> 0, and thus
the profit function of the manufacturer is a concave
function of pd and wm. Using (8) and (9) in (7) and
simplifying, we obtain the optimal retail price of the
product with decentralized decisions as followsþ ab1ð3b2q þ að2þ q ÞÞ

b2at Þ ð13ÞFrom (8), (9) and (13), we have the optimal de-
mands of the product in retail and online channels, the
profit of the retailer, and the pure and total profit of the
manufacturer with decentralized decisions as follows
D*r ¼
b1ð2ab2q b1cb2ð2t Þþb2cat aðaþb2qÞt Þ
ð2tÞðb2ð4aþb1ð4t ÞÞb2atÞ
ð14Þð1 q Þð4 tÞ þ að4 2q tÞÞÞ
b2atÞ ð15Þ
ð16Þ
a ðaþ b2q ÞtÞF1þ
 q Þð4 t Þ þ a ð4 2 q tÞÞÞF2Þ
 tÞÞ  b2atÞ2
 ð17Þ
2ÞaÞq2
	
2þ b22b1

q2

tþ
ðb1 b2ÞaqÞtÞþ
b2aþ b1b2ÞtÞ
3
775
b2atÞÞ ð18Þ
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F1 ¼ 4b1b2ðb2caþ b1cb2 aðaþ b2q ÞÞ
þ ðb2aþ b1b2Þðb2caþ b1cb2  aðaþ b2qÞÞt2
þ  4b21cb22 þ a ðða b2cÞa ð3b2þ 2aÞ
þ ab2ð4b2þ 3aÞqÞ þ b1b2ð  cað7b2þ 2aÞ
þ a ð4b2qþ a ð3þ q ÞÞÞ

t
and
F2 ¼ cðb2aþ b1b2Þ

a ð2að2 tÞ þ b2ð4 tÞð1 tÞÞ
þ b1

að2 tÞ2þ b2ð4 tÞð1 tÞ

þ a b21b2ð  1þ qÞð4 tÞð1 tÞ
þ a2ð2að  2þ tÞ  b2ð4þ tð  5þ qþ tÞÞÞ

þ ab1a

4b2ð  2þ qÞ þ ð10b2þ 7a
 3ð2b2þ aÞqÞtþ ð aþ b2ð  2þ qÞÞt2

Here, the consumer can buy the product from both
retail and online channels. The retailer operates its
channel in competition with the online channel. The
retailer has to buy the product from the manufacturer
and then sell it to the consumers, and, in doing so, it
makes a profit. Thus, the concept of dual channels will
be feasible only when the selling prices in both retail
and online channels are higher than the wholesale price
of the manufacturer. That is, the optimal pricing
strategy of the decentralized system is acceptable to
the channel members only when p*r >w
*
m and p
*
d >w
*
m.
Now, p*d >w
*
m if q < qmax, whereqmax ¼
b2cðb1þ 2aÞðb2aþ b1b2Þ t þ a

b21b2ð4 tÞð1 tÞ  2b2a2tþ b1að4að1 tÞ þ b2ð4 ð7 tÞtÞÞ

a

4ðb1 þ b2Þb1b2

5b21b2þ 4b2ab2þ b1

4b22þ 11b2aþ 4a2

tþ ðb1þ b2Þðb2aþ b1b2Þt 2
 ð19Þand p*r >w
*
m if
q>
b1cb2ð2 tÞ þ ða b2cÞat
2ab2 ab2t
¼ qmin ð20Þ
Note that, both qmin and qmax depend on t, i.e., on
the degree of social concern of the manufacturer. It is
observed that this range will be valid until qmax > qmin,
and, solving qmax  qmin ¼ 0, we have three values of
t,


2; b1b2þb1ab1b2þb1aþb2a;
4 ðb1b2þb1aþb2aþa2Þ
b1b2þb1aþb2a

. Among thesethree values of t, only b1b2þb1ab1b2þb1aþb2a2ð0; 1Þ, and hence
it is acceptable because t2ð0; 1Þ. That is, qmax > qmin
if t2

0; b1b2þb1ab1b2þb1aþb2a

t. From the above discussion,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The pricing policy of the decentralized
socially responsible dual-channel supply chain can be
operated successfully if the product compatibility
parameter q2ðqmin; qmaxÞ and the degree of social
concern of the manufacturer t2

0; b1b2þb1ab1b2þb1aþb2a

.
From Fig. 1, one can observe that, to operate the
dual-channel successfully, the manufacturer cannot set
its degree of social concern, i.e., the value of t, above
the threshold b1b2þb1ab1b2þb1aþb2a because,
whent2

b1b2þb1a
b1b2þb1aþb2a; 1

, qmax < qmin, i.e., the
pricing policy of the dual channels becomes infeasible.
Thus, from Proposition 1, we can conclude that the
manufacturer cannot show CSR concern over a
threshold to operate a decentralized dual-channel sup-
ply chain. It also indicates that the customer's channel
preference is one of the determining factors for oper-
ating an online channel in addition to the traditional
retail channel. When q< qmin, the retailer cannot do
business because its selling price is less than the man-
ufacturer's wholesale price. Alternately, for q> qmax, the
manufacturer cannot set the optimal selling price as the
online price exists.The online selling price is higher
than the wholesale price. This does not ensure that theretailer will participate in the profit-making retail/e-tail
channel; the retailer will participate in the dual channels
only when its demand in the retail channel is positive,
i.e., D*r > 0, i.e., if
q >
b1cb2ð2 t Þ þ ða b2 cÞ a t
2ab2 a b2t
¼ qr ð21Þ
Note that qr ¼ qmin. Alternately, the manufacturer will
operate the online channel until the demand in the on-
line channel is positive, i.e., D*d > 0, i.e., if
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of qmin and qmax with respect to t.
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ab1ð4 tÞ  b2c að4 tÞ  b1cð4 b2þ 2 a b2tÞ
að2 aþ b1ð4 tÞÞ
¼ qm
ð22Þ
Eqs. (21) and (22) suggest that the manufacturer can
successfully operate a profitable dual-channel supply
chain when the customer's retail channel preference lies
between qmin and minfqm; qmaxg. This result is quite
obvious because the manufacturer will operate the on-
line channel only when both the channels are profit-
able.Thus, another proposition is as follows.
Proposition 2. The manufacturer can operate a profit-
able retail-online channel when the customers' retail
channel preference q2ðqmin; minfqm; qmaxgÞ.
Further, comparing selling prices of retail and online
channels, we have p*r > p
*
d if q > q1, whereq1 ¼

cðb2aþ b1b2Þð2 b1b2  ðb1  b2ÞatÞ þ aðb21b2ð4 tÞð1 tÞ
b2a2tþ b1aðað4 3tÞ þ b2ð4þ ð 6þ tÞ tÞÞ
 
aðb21b2ð4 tÞð1 tÞ þ b2að6aþ b2ð3 tÞð2 tÞ  4atÞ
þb1

6b22 ðb2þ 2aÞð5b2 þ 2aÞtþ b2ðb2 þ 2aÞt2
  ð23ÞNow, combining the above results with Proposition 1,
we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In a socially responsible decentralized
dual-channel supply chain, the optimal retail price is
higher than the online selling price if
q2ðq1; minfqm; qmaxgÞ, and the reverse may be
noted for q2ðqmin; q1Þ.
From Fig. 2, one may note that p*r  w*m if q  qmin
and p*d  w*m if qmax. The optimal online selling priceðp*dÞ decreases with increasing product compatibility,
whereas the optimal retail price ðp*r Þ increases with
increasing product compatibility. The optimal online
selling price coincides with the retail price when
q ¼ q1. In the next subsection, we shall study the
centralized decisions of the socially responsible dual-
channel supply chain when the channel members act
as a single entity.Centralized decisions
When the channel members cooperate and find the
decision that maximizes the supply chain performance,
it requires a centralized decision-making process. It
may be assumed that there is a single decision-maker
who produces and sells the product to the customers.
The total profit of the channel is the sum of the pureprofit ðpcÞ and the consumer surplus (CSc) that the
channel accrues from the stakeholders. The profit
function of the channel is
vc ¼ pcþCSc ð24Þ
where pc ¼ ðpr  cÞDr þ ðpd  cÞDd and
CSc ¼ D
2
r
2b1
þ D2d2b2. The necessary conditions dvc/dpr ¼ 0
and dvc/dpd ¼ 0, for the existence of the optimal solu-
tion yield the optimal values of the selling prices as
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
2b1b2ðb2caþ b1cb2þ aðaþ b2q ÞÞ þ aðb2aþ b1b2Þðaþ b2qÞt2
b2

b21cb2 þ b1cað3b2þ 2aÞ þ að2ðaþ b2 cÞ aþ 3ab2qÞ þ ab1ð3b2qþ að2þ qÞÞ

t

ðb2aþ b1b2Þ

a

b2ð2 tÞ2þ 4að1 tÞ
þ b1b2ð2 tÞ2 ð25Þandpdc ¼

2b1b2ðb2caþ b1cb2þ aðb1  b1qÞÞ þ a ðb2aþ b1b2Þðb1 b1q Þt2
b1ðcðb2þ 2aÞðb2aþ b1b2Þ þ að3b1b2ð1 qÞ þ að3b2 þ 2a b2qÞÞÞt

ðb2aþ b1b2Þ

a

b2ð2 tÞ2þ 4að1 tÞ
þ b1b2ð2 tÞ2 ð26ÞTo check the concavity of the total centralized
channel profit function, we take the second-order par-
tial derivatives of the total centralized channel profit
function, which are as follows
v2vc
p2r
¼b1ð2 tÞ þ a

 2þ ðb2þ 2aÞt
b2þ a

;
v2vc
p2d
¼b2ð2 tÞ þ a

 2þ ðb1þ 2aÞt
b1þ a

and
v2vc
prpd
¼ 2að1 tÞ:
Hence, we havev2vc
p2r
v2vc
p2d


v2vc
prpd
2
¼ ðb2aþ b1b2Þ

a

b2ð2 tÞ2 þ 4að1
b1b2
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of optimalClearly, v
2vc
p2r
< 0, v
2vc
p2
d
< 0 and v
2vc
p2r
v2vc
p2
d


v2vc
prpd
2
> 0,
for all t2 ½0; 1. Thus, the total profit function of
the centralized channel ðvcÞ is a concave function of pd
and pr. Hence, the optimal selling prices
ðprc and& pdcÞ provide the global maximum to (24).
From (25) and (26), we obtain the optimal values of
the demand of the product in the retail and online
channels for the centralized decision, which are as
followstÞþ b1b2ð2 tÞ2>0
decentralized prices with respect to q.
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a

b2ð2t Þ2þ4að1tÞ
þb1b2ð2t Þ2
ð27Þ
andDdc ¼ b2ð  2b1ðb2cþ að  1þ qÞÞ þ ðb2ca ab1 þ b1cb2þ ab1q Þt Þ
a

b2ð2 t Þ2þ 4að1 tÞ
þ b1b2ð2 t Þ2 ð28ÞThe optimal pure and total profits of the centralized
channel are as follows
p*c ¼ ðprc cÞDrcþ ðpdc cÞDdc ð29Þ
and
v*c ¼ ðprc  cÞDrcþ ðpdc  cÞDdc þ t

D2rc
2b1
þD
2
dc
2b2

ð30Þ
In the context of centralized decision-making, the
manufacturer would be interested in opening the onlineq2 ¼ 2ab1b1b2  ððb1 b2Þcaðb2aþ b1b2Þ þ ab1ðb2aþ 3b1b2ÞÞtþ ab1ðb2aþ b1b2Þ t
2
a

2ðb1þ b2Þb1b2 

3b21b2þ b1 ðb2þ 2 aÞð3b2þ 2 aÞ þ b2a ð3 b2þ 4 aÞ

t þ ðb1þ b2Þðb2 aþ b1 b2Þt2

ð33Þchannel only when the online channel demand is
positive, i.e. Ddc > 0, which, after simplification, yields
q<
ab1ð2 tÞ  2b2cb1þ cðb2aþ b1b2Þt
2ab1 ab1t
¼ qcmax
ð31Þ
Alternately, the minimum level of product compat-
ibility for operating a centralized retail channel can be
found from Drc > 0. This, after simplification, yields
q>
b1cb2ð2 tÞ þ ða b2cÞat
2ab2 ab2t
¼ qcmin ð32Þ
Although the manufacturer and the retailer co-
operate and make decisions jointly in the centralized
channel, the product compatibility has an impact on the
manufacturer's decision to open the online channel. In
the i-th replenishment cycle, if the customers' retail
channel preference is higher than the threshold qcmax,then the manufacturer's decision to open an online
channel is not profitable because its online demand is
negative in this case. However, there must be competi-
tion between the retail channel and the online channel in
the centralized process even though the channel mem-bers co-operate. The channel members make decisions
jointly, but the market potential remains the same.When
the manufacturer operates an online channel, some
customers switch to the online channel; as a result, the
retailer's demand decreases, and it earns less profit. In
addition to the selling prices of the retail and online
channels, the customers' channel preference determines
the divisions of the potential market demand. Thus, like
in the decentralized decision-making process, here also
the selling prices of the retail channelmay be higher than
the online channel, i.e., prc > pdc, i.e., if q> q2, whereFrom the above discussion, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. The manufacturer can operate a
centralized dual-channel supply chain if
q2ðqcmin; qcmaxÞ. The online selling price is higher than
the retail price for any q2ðqcmin; q2Þ, and the retail
price is higher than the online price for any
q2ðq2; qcmax; Þ.
Proposition 4 demonstrates that, when the channel
members cooperate and make decisions jointly, the
manufacturer's decision to open an online channel is
profitable only when the customers' retail channel
preference lies between qcmin and& q
c
max. Interestingly,
between these thresholds of the product compatibility,
there exists a price competition between the retail
channel and the online channel. If the customers' retail
channel preference is within ðqcmin; q2Þ; then the on-
line price will be higher than the retail price, and the
Fig. 3. Graphical representation of optimal centralized prices with respect to q.
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analytical findings. Thus, for a profitable centralized
retail/online channel, the channel will set the selling
prices according to the customers' channel prefer-
ence.Observe that both qcmin and q
c
max depend on the
degree of the manufacturer's social concern, i.e., on t. A
centralized dual-channel supply chain will be feasible
only when qcmin  qcmax. Solving qcmax  qcmin ¼ 0 for t,
we obtain two values for t,
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2b1 b2
p
=ð ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃb1b2p  aÞ andﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2b1 b2
p
=ð ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃb1b2p þ aÞ. Clearly, both values are greater
than 1 because
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
b1 b2
p
>a. However, t2ð0; 1Þ,
hence we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. A centralized dual-channel supply chain
will be feasible for any degree of the manufacturer's
social concern.
Proposition 5 shows the feasibility of a centralized
dual-channel supply chain, i.e., that positive demands in
both channels exist in the centralized scenario for any
degree of the manufacturer's social concern. This is in
contrast to the decentralized scenario, for which the
manufacturer cannot exhibit CSR above a certain
threshold. Hence, channel coordination is essential not
only for profit enhancement but also for the perfor-
mance of a high level of social responsibility. In the next
section, we shall analyse the issue of channel
coordination.Coordination through all unit quantity discount
contracts
Coordination among the channel members is
essential to optimize system performance. Thus, a key
issue in supply chain management is to develop
mechanisms that can align channel members andobjectives and coordinate their activities to obtain
centralized channel profit. To implement a centralized
pricing policy, the manufacturer offers to the retailer
that online selling prices will be adjusted according to
a centralized policy, as well provides all unit quantity
discounts as an incentive to the retailer. The online
selling price of the manufacturer under the coordinated
scenario is ðpd  RÞ, and the discounted wholesale
price of the manufacturer is w*m ð42ð0; 1ÞÞ. Under
this mechanism, the profit function of the retailer and
total profit function of the manufacturer are, respec-
tively, as follows
prco ¼

pr 4w*m
ðqa b1pr þ aðpd R prÞÞ ð34Þ
vmco ¼

4w*m c
ðqa b1pr þ aðpd R prÞÞ
þ ðpd R cÞðð1 q Þa b2ðpd RÞ
þ aðpr  pd þRÞÞ
þ t
"
ðqa b1pr þ aðpd R prÞÞ2
2b1
þ ðð1 q Þa b2ðpd RÞ þ aðpr  pd þRÞÞ
2
2b2
#
ð35Þ
In a decentralized dual-channel supply chain for a
given wholesale price ðw*mÞ of the manufacturer and
price for the online channel ðpd  RÞ, prco is concave
in pr, hence solving dprco=dpr ¼ 0, and we get
prco ¼ pdaRaþ aqþw
*
mb14
2b1
ð36Þ
The channel will be coordinated only if the retailer's
self-optimized selling price ðprcoÞ under the all unit
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ized retail price, i.e., prco ¼ prc. Solving prco  prc ¼ 0
for the fraction of the wholesale price discount 4, we
get4co ¼ 2
"
2b1b2ðb2caþ b1cb2þ aðaþ b2qÞÞ þ aðb2aþ b1b2Þðaþ b2qÞt2
wmðb2aþ b1b2Þ

a

b2ð2 tÞ2 þ 4að1 tÞ
þ b1b2ð2 tÞ2
#
 2ðpdaRaþ aqÞ
wmb1
 2b2

b21cb2 þ b1ca ð3b2 þ 2aÞ þ að2ðaþ b2cÞaþ 3ab2qÞ þ ab1ð3b2qþ að2þ qÞÞ

t
wmðb2aþ b1b2Þ

a

b2ð2 tÞ2 þ 4að1 tÞ
þ b1b2ð2 tÞ2 ð37ÞThus, the retailer will agree to sell the product at the
centralized retail price if 4 ¼ 4co. However, one may
note that 4co depends on the online selling price ðpdÞ of
the manufacturer. In the second stage, in response to
the retailer's decision, the manufacturer will optimize
its total profit function. Hence, by solving
vmco=dpd ¼ 0, the online selling price ðpdcoÞ of the
manufacturer can be determined. In contrast, the
manufacturer has to adjust its online price for channel
coordination. Thus, the adjustment in the online selling
price that the manufacturer will consider, is given by
Rco ¼ ðpdco  pdcÞ, which yieldsRco ¼ ab1ð2ab2qþ b1cb2ð  2þ tÞ þ b2cat aðaþ b2qÞtÞðb1b2þ aðb2þ 2aÞÞ

a

b2ð2 tÞ2þ 4að1 tÞ
þ b1b2ð2 tÞ2ð  2þ tÞ ð38ÞThus, profits of the retailer and the manufacturer are
as follows
p*rco ¼
b1ð2ab2qþ b1cb2ð  2þ tÞ þ b2cat aðaþ b2qÞtÞ2
a

b2ð2 tÞ2þ 4að1 tÞ
þ b1b2ð2 tÞ22
ð39Þv*mco  v*m ¼
2b1ð2ab2þ b1b2ð2 tÞ  b2atÞð2ab2q b1c
a

b2ð2 tÞ2þ 4að1 tÞ
þ b1b2ð2 tÞ22ðv*mco ¼

4cow
*
m c

Drcþ ðpdcoRco cÞDdc
þ t

D2rc
2b1
þD
2
dc
2b2
 ð40ÞHere, v*mco þ p*rco ¼ v*c , which means that the total
channel profit under the proposed contract mechanism
is exactly equal to the total centralized channel profit,
and we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6. The all unit quantity discount with the
set of contracts ðRco; 4coÞ of the manufacturer can
coordinate a socially responsible dual-channel supply
chain.The above analysis shows that our proposed all unit
quantity discount can coordinate the supply chain and
allows the manufacturer to earn a positive profit. Note
that the difference in total profit of the manufacturer
between coordinated and decentralized scenarios is as
followsb2ð2 tÞ þ b2cat aðaþ b2qÞtÞ2
2 tÞð4ab2þ b1b2ð4 tÞ  b2atÞ
<0 ð41Þ
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with their respective decentralized profits, we find that,
due to coordination, profits of the retailer are enhanced
significantly, which improves the dual-channel supply
chain efficiency but fails to provide benefit to the
manufacturer. Next, we shall discuss the implementa-
tion of the contract with a complementary agreement
between the manufacturer and the retailer that not only
coordinates the dual-channel supply chain but also en-
sures a win-win strategy for both members of the chain.All unit quantity discount with the agreement of
franchise fees
In the previous section, we have already shown that
an all unit quantity discount contract can coordinate
the channel, but it cannot provide a winewin condition
for the manufacturer. Thus, for successful imple-
mentation of the contract, suppose that the manufac-
turer charges a franchise fee F to the retailer. When a
franchise fee F satisfies p*rco  F  p*r , the retailer will
accept a ðRco; 4co; FÞ contract, which yields
F  p*rco p*r ¼ F ð42Þ
Alternately, the minimum franchise fee charged by
the manufacturer to the retailer is given by
F  v*m v*mco ¼ F ð43Þ
Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7. The all unit quantity discount with the
agreement of franchise fees can coordinate a two-level
socially responsible dual-channel supply chain and
provide a win-win opportunity for the channel members
for the franchise fee F if it satisfies the inequality
F  F  F.
Proposition 7 suggests that a higher F benefits the
manufacturer, whereas a lower F benefits the retailer.
The value of F depends heavily on the bargaining power
of the retailer in the supply chain. In the next subsec-
tion, we shall discuss the outcomes of bargaining.Determination of franchise fees through bargaining
Bargaining refers to situations where two or more
players who have the opportunity to collaborate form
mutual benefit in more than one way. To determine the
exact value of franchise fees and profits of respective
channel members, we use the generalized asymmetricNash bargaining solution [33]. Nash proposed a basic
framework to construct a negotiation model among
players. Suppose the manufacturer and the retailer have
bargaining powers of, respectively, g and
1 g ðg2 ð0; 1ÞÞ. Let Dm and Dr denote the sur-
plus profit share of the manufacturer and the retailer,
respectively. The functional forms of Dm and Dr are as
follows
DmðFÞ ¼

v*mcoþF v*m
¼ XmþF ð44Þ
DrðFÞ ¼

p*rco Fp*r
¼ Xr F ð45Þ
where Xm ¼ v*mco  v*m and Xr ¼ p*rco  p*r .
The total surplus profit generated through coopera-
tion is equal to Dm þ Dr ¼ Xm þ Xr. According to
generalized asymmetric Nash bargaining, we must
maximize the following function
DðFÞ ¼ maxFFFDgmDð1gÞr ð46Þ
The equilibrium solution of the above Nash bar-
gaining product can be obtained by solving v logDvF ¼ 0
and is found as follows
Fb ¼ gXr  ð1g ÞXm ð47Þ
Using the bargaining solution of franchise fees, we
secure the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer
after bargaining as follows
vbmco ¼ v*mþ gðXmþXrÞ ð48Þ
pbrco ¼ p*r þ ð1 gÞðXm þXrÞ ð49Þ
Note that, in particular, if all players involved in the
bargaining procedure have equal bargaining power,
i.e., g ¼ 1=2, then each and every one obtains an equal
share ððXm þ XrÞ=2Þ of the total surplus. From the
above results, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 8. (i) The bargaining outcome of franchise
fees depends on channel members' bargaining power.
(ii) The surplus profit of the channel generated through
coordination is distributed between the channel mem-
bers according to the ratio of their bargaining power.
Thus, the all unit quantity discount contract com-
bined with the adjustment of the online selling price
achieves channel coordination but fails to provide
benefit to the manufacturer. However, with the agree-
ment of the franchise fee, a win-win opportunity is
248 N.M. Modak et al. / Pacific Science Review 16 (2014) 235e249provided to both members. Finally, through Nash
asymmetric bargaining, the members find their equi-
librium profit within the win-win range depending on
their bargaining power.Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper, the analysis of a dual-channel socially
responsible supply chain has been conducted. In a
Stackelberg setting, the manufacturer, the leader of the
channel, exhibits CSR. While formulating the model,
we have incorporated only the effect of CSR in the form
of consumer surplus in the socially responsible firm's
profit function rather than the activities that it performs.
The paper explores the pricing decision through both
decentralized and centralized channels. The effect of
CSR on the successful operation of dual channels is
analysed. To coordinate the channel and obtain profit
equal to the integrated system, a hybrid coordination
mechanism is developed. The coordination mechanism
not only coordinates the channel but also achieves a
winewin outcome for the channel members. Finally,
the manufacturer and the retailer share the surplus profit
through a Nash bargaining solution.
This paper makes contributions to many aspects.
First, the paper considers the effect of CSR on the
dual-channel supply chain. Second, the paper develops
decentralized and centralized models considering the
effect of CSR on consumer surplus. Third, it examines
the effect of CSR on product compatibility and dis-
cusses the feasibility of the successful operation of
dual channels for both decentralized and centralized
supply chains. It is analytically shown that the feasi-
bility of a centralized dual-channel supply chain exists
for any degree of the manufacturer's social concern. In
the decentralized scenario, the manufacturer cannot
exhibit CSR above a certain threshold and still operate
the dual channels successfully. Fifth, an all unit
quantity discount with the agreement of a franchise fee
not only cuts out channel conflict but also provides a
winewin opportunity for the channel members. Sixth,
through Nash bargaining, the members find their
equilibrium profit within the winewin range in the
ratio of their bargaining powers. As far as the authors
are aware, such a discussion within a single model has
not yet been studied for supply chains.
Although the proposed model provides some ideas
about a socially responsible supply chain that can be
managed in the sense of pure profit maximization, it has
some limitations. First, the demand is assumed to be
deterministic and linear in price. This model can beextended immediately for uncertain price-dependent
demand. Second, the CSR has a great impact on the
channel members' pure profits. Under the present model
settings, a threshold of CSR for the non-negative pure
profit of the manufacturer is identified. However,
detailed investigation is required to find a specific range
of it. Third, the paper applies a transfer pricing policy for
channel coordination and then uses a Nash bargaining
product for profit division. Instead, strategic bargaining
may be used for the same purpose, as indicated. These
variations make the model robust and may discover a
variety of characteristics of a socially responsible sup-
ply chain. Moreover, manufacturing disruptions due to
reliability of the manufacturing system, asymmetric
information, supply disruptions, cases of imperfect
quality products, environmental issues for production,
etc. are neglected here. These may be included in an
extension of the proposed model in the future.
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